Revealed: Iran’s secret military base shipping ballistic missiles overseas

Opposition group’s report on Shahid Soltani Garrison comes as Tehran’s Russian and Houthi rebel allies step up rocket attacks

Iran is rapidly expanding a secretive military site used to manufacture ballistic missiles for export overseas, The Telegraph can reveal.
The clandestine site is used to store and prepare missiles before they are shipped overseas to Tehran’s proxies and allies.
Activity at the site, known as the “Shahid Soltani Garrison”, has intensified in the second half of the year, coinciding with reports from Western governments that Iran had begun shipping ballistic missiles to Russia.
At the same time, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, an Iranian-backed terror group, ramped up their use of ballistic missiles in attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea.
The site is located north-east of Tehran, nestled in a mountainous area between the cities of Karaj and Eshtehard.
It falls under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Al-Ghadir missile command unit.
As well as having operational control of Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles,  Al-Ghadir is responsible for transporting weapons and specialists to train its proxies and allies to use them.
The IRGC unit has been under US and EU sanctions for over a decade.
The Israeli military has said it is planning a “serious and significant” retaliatory strike in response to Iran’s recent ballistic missile barrage, which could include strikes on sites like the Soltani Garrison.
The intelligence on the new site was compiled by the National Council for Resistance in Iran, an opposition group, with the help of sources inside the country and the IRGC.
The group has a strong track record of gathering intelligence on the Iranian regime’s secret operations.
It was the first to reveal the existence of the clandestine Natanz nuclear site, Tehran’s main uranium enrichment site, in 2002.
Hossein Abedini, a senior member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, said: “Exporting terrorism, fundamentalism, and warmongering are the other side of domestic repression and an integral part of the regime’s strategy for survival.
“The regime’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly declared that if we do not fight outside Iran’s borders, we will have to fight the enemy in Iranian cities.”
He added: “This explains why the regime needs belligerence, the export of extremism, proxy forces and focuses on nuclear weapons and missile programmes, plundering the Iranian people’s wealth and resources to this effect.”
The missile site’s last-known commander was Brigadier General Partovi, the opposition group said.
He is supported by members of the IRGC’s local branch in nearby Eshtehard.
The site consists of a series of warehouses that were built about 15 years ago and a newer network of underground tunnels developed more recently.
The missiles believed to be stored at the site include the Shabab 3, a medium-range ballistic missile fired from a mobile launcher, and Fattah class rockets, which have been given to Russia.
The base is separated into two areas, the first with at least five large warehouses, covering around 6,500 square metres.
One of the blue-roofed buildings is around 20 metres tall, indicating the presence of an internal crane to move cargo around.
Satellite imagery of the site in July 2024 shows more than 10 trailers were outside the facility, indicating increased activity.
A second set of around 10 white-roofed structures, covering around 3,000 square metres, sits adjacent.
Alongside the surface installations, there are two tunnels spanning about 305 metres from end-to-end. Excavation started in 2017 and was finished four years later.
Close to the tunnel openings there are what appear to be ventilation ducts.
Iran has a history of building tunnels alongside its military and nuclear installations to protect them from air strikes.
Last year, its regime unveiled details of what it claimed to be a tunnel network used to house air defence systems.
Underground tunnels were also constructed around the Natanz nuclear site, which analysts said were so deep that US air strikes would be unable to reach them.
Local officials, according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, say the area around Soltani Garrison is both sensitive and secretive.
Guards are stationed on the road leading up to the facility, with only vehicles belonging to missile site personnel allowed beyond the checkpoint.
The site is protected by two rows of barbed wire and locals are not permitted to approach or take photographs in its direction.